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Abstract 
This essay examines why, over the last several hundred years, significant 
economic growth has occurred in the West, but not elsewhere. It concludes 
that, although institutional considerations and the process of innovation 
have been intrinsic elements of Western progress, neither serves as a 
complete explanation. Further causes, many of which are primarily 
cultural, social, or geographic, must be taken into account. Any attempt to 
answer the question of Western progress must involve the above concerns, 
otherwise it will be at best incomplete. 
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This paper will examine explanations for Western progress, evaluate these 
explanations, and attempt to provide insight to the question of Western 
growth. We will be looking at various perspectives, in particular those of 
Nathan Rosenberg, Joseph Needham, and Lynn White. The views of several 
others will also be cited. 
There are many ways that our main question can be answered. Indeed, 
there are several views which I will present, some of which overlap, but 
each with its own perspective and its own truth. None of the views taken 
independently are complete answers. There are perhaps countless 'causes' 
of Western progress, each an important element- but each (taken in itself) 
incomplete; perhaps neither necessary, nor sufficient. I will concentrate 
on those elements of Western growth that I believe were necessary and, 
when taken together, sufficient. In the end, we will be left with a 
combination of answers that, in concert, go a long way towards answering 
our question. 
Many different hypotheses exist regarding why the West progressed as it 
did. Indeed, there are many that deserve a second look, not only due to 
their insights, but also because they are simple and readily 
understandable. Even Rosenberg mentions several of these opposing views. 
will briefly look at just three before proceeding to Rosenberg's view. 
A simple answer to why the West grew rich is found in natural 
resources. After all, we know they were integral to our development. To 
those who believe this explanation, it is simply a 
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matter of ownership of natural resources leading inevitably to economic 
growth. Certainly here in Canada the argument could be made. But what of 
elsewhere? As Rosenberg points out, many developed countries have 
virtually no natural resources, and yet have some of the highest standards 
of living in the world, such as the Low Countries and Switzerland. At the 
same time, many countries with large amounts of natural resources 
remain economically stagnant, (Russia, China, and much of South America). 
Clearly what matters is not just the presence of natural resources, but 
the skills to extract and use those resources for the advancement of 
wealth. So the question is not one of ownership of natural resources, but 
instead, How did the West generate those skills needed to put the 
resources to use? This question will be further looked at later on. 
Another such explanation might be found in colonialism. Certainly some 
Marxists believe it to be a source of economic growth and advancement. 
Indeed, in some historical cases, it has paid off. Spain with its gold 
discoveries, or the French in the early days of Algeria, for example. Yet, by 
and large colonialism has cost more than it has benefitted the mother 
countries: an example being the French in Inda-China. Further, some 
colonial powers have remained economically under-developed, for instance 
Portugal. And what of non-colonial powers such as Switzerland, who are 
relatively wealthy and have never ventured outside their own borders? So, 
while colonialism may have played a role in the development of some 
countries, it can also be shown that it played no role in the development 
of others. I believe we can consider colonialism's role in Western 
development to be relatively minor. 
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What about luck? Perhaps the West was set on the road to riches by 
fundamentally random occurrences, and that the explanation of Western 
growth is as escapable as asking why someone won the lottery. To many 
this is an appealing hypothesis. It avoids some of the unsavoury 
explanations often posed, many of which point to necessary inequalities, 
exploitation of the poor, or sometimes racism. And of course, luck is an 
explanation consistent with at least some of the West's experience: if 
institutional and organisational change has been intrinsic to Western 
progress, one must admit that the outcomes of such innovations are rarely 
known from the outset, and thus the results are often those of chance. On 
the other hand, given that Western Economic growth has been rolling along 
for a few hundred years (the exact amount of time depending on who you 
read) is it realistic to believe such performance could be sustained on 
luck? Was luck a necessary component of Western progress? As Rosenberg 
says, " ... for some purposes, a sufficient explanation of how the West grew 
rich would be, 'By the sweat of the poor and the plunder and 
enslavement of the weak ... "', (Rosenberg and Birdzell, "How the West Grew 
Rich", New York, 1987. pg.20). It could be argued that slavery, or luck, 
certainly helped the process of Western development, yet it is not clear 
that either were necessary elements. 
We obviously need something that not only goes to the root of Western 
growth, but also looks at Western economies and economic history in a 
comprehensive way. 
In attempting to understand why vast, long term economic growth has 
occurred in the West but not elsewhere, it is appropriate to study those 
elements of Western economies that have been necessary for growth. One 
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might point to various institutions such as free markets, private property, 
money, and so on. After all, such devices are the mechanisms by which we 
generate economic activity. Indeed, they might seem to be the wheels of 
the 'juggernaut' we call growth. Yet they are inventions; they are the 
symptoms of economic growth, and as well they have facilitated economic 
growth, but they are not the cause. 
However, in reading Nathan Rosenberg's "How the West Grew Rich", one 
might come away with a slightly different opinion. It is the flexibility of 
the West's institutions which he hypothesises to have allowed such 
dramatic growth. The dynamism and talent for adaptation which 
characterises Western institutions, has led to its wealth. 
Rather than referring to a specific point in history, or a particular 
innovation, Rosenberg asserts that no such starting point of Western 
economic superiority can be defined. He identifies the "gradualism" 
(lbid.pg.6) of the West's growth, and that due to this gradualism it is more 
difficult to ascertain a "cause". 
A significant insight of Rosenberg's is that "the immediate sources of 
Western growth were innovations in trade, technology, and organization, 
in combination with accumulation of more and more capital, labour, and 
applied natural resources. Innovation emerged as a significant factor in 
Western growth as early as the mid-fifteenth century and from the mid-
eighteenth century on it has been pervasive and dominant."(lbid. pg.20) In 
fact, he considers innovation "virtually an additional factor of production." 
(lac.cit.) 
Innovation is important to understanding growth, but what brings about 
innovation? Rosenberg looks at firms, markets, and competition as playing 
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important roles. Economic enterprises had, by the mid-eighteenth century, 
(Ibid., pg.24), evolved into autonomous units, capable of making their own 
economic decisions, and capable of failing or succeeding based on their 
actions. And their actions were up to them - in other words, when given 
the responsibility for their own economic status, they did that which 
allowed them to succeed. Therein was the incentive for firms to become 
innovators. 
Markets and competition served to intensify innovation, in that not only 
did the markets provide ample testing ground for new products or 
services, but also the existence of competing firms assured that 
enterprises would innovate or perish. 
Further, the evolution of autonomy for entrepeneurs allowed the 
merchant class to continue to expand the economic sphere. A firm's right 
to exist, to trade, to win or lose, contributed to not only an autonomous 
economic sphere, but also to motivation for innovation. 
So, inherent to economic change and growth was the emergence of an 
autonomous economic sphere. No longer were the politics, religion, and 
economics of a society fully integrated. By the seventeen hundreds, each 
had become relatively autonomous. No longer were the economics of a 
society under the political and religious jurisdiction of feudalism. 
Correspondingly, all forms of entrepeneurship started growing- including 
trade (at unregulated prices). With this growth, the merchant class grew 
too, encouraged by the weakening of guild and government control of the 
starting of new businesses. 
The merchant class kept growing as economic progress continued. And, 
as markets continued to expand with trade, so did the range of available 
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goods. As consumers got more, they demanded more. Competition grew 
amongst merchants, not only in prices and goods variety, but also 
innovation- innovation in production methods, costs of production, and the 
introduction of new products. As the expansion of trade and development 
of resources continued, the bounds of existing technology were being tried 
and pushed outward. Innovation became increasingly the means by which 
economic growth occurred. The skilled artisan was quickly becoming 
obsolete. 
More than ever, the sphere of science was being utilised by the economic 
sphere to assist in the process of innovation. Out of need, industry turned 
to scientists to aid them in change; however, the vistas that science held 
in terms of potential innovation were also recognised. The economic 
sphere turned to pure science not only for its survival, but also because of 
the possibilities it offered. 
Links developed between these spheres, and they were mutually 
beneficial. Experimentation represented the possibility of succeeding (or 
failing) and it was a means of potentially making money. Industry fuelled 
increased experimentation and innovation. Because now the strongest 
incentive of all had found its way in to the realm of scientific inquiry: 
money. 
Although innovation is considered predominantly in terms of technology, 
Rosenberg stresses the importance of innovation in organisation as well. 
As the economies of Western countries have grown, and as 
they have changed their methods ... and products, they have 
constantly modified the size and structure of their enterprise 
organizations. 
And later 
In addition, the competitive element within Western 
economies ... led enterprises to try to differentiate 
themselves from other enterprises in ways that 
carried a competitive advantage ... This combination 
of necessary adaptation ... and competitive attempts 
at self-differentiation has produced diversity in the 
size, ... functions, and organization of enterprises. 
(lbid.pg.28) 
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The conclusion of Rosenberg is that innovation in technology and 
organisation was the source of the West's economic growth. But just as 
important were the elements which allowed this innovation to occur. He 
sums them up in three "thematic terms" which we have so far discussed: 
autonomy, experiment, and diversity. Of further interest is Rosenberg's 
identification of the "causal loop" existing between experiment and 
additional resources and human wants. Experiment created not only new 
resources, but also sparked an ever expanding desire to consume, both of 
which fuelled additional experiment. 
Rosenberg's look at the West's growth to riches is thorough, in that he 
describes the history of Western economic growth with precision. Further, 
his explanations for Western growth may seem intuitively appealing. Yet, 
to my mind they do not fully answer the fundamental question which we 
are trying to answer: Why? (Why the West). 
Yes, Rosenberg talks of autonomy, innovation, and flexibility. Yet these 
answers seem to be telling us a story, rather than telling us what was 
behind the development of these things. And, I think the reason for this is 
that Rosenberg does not go back far enough in history. 
He starts with the middle ages around the thirteenth century, for two 
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reasons: A) Up to this point, Chinese, Islamic, and Western wealth were 
all on a roughly equal footing; B) Prior to this point, Western institutions 
had not been functioning in "an approximately normal way" (lbid.pg.37) 
(where Rosenberg considers "normal" as meaning relatively modern in the 
economic sense). Rosenberg does not go back far enough in my opinion. 
This is all the more difficult to understand, given Rosenberg's perception 
that "it is important to keep this long and uncertain time gap between 
cause and effect in mind when we ... evaluate possible explanations of 
Western growth."(lbid.pg.8) 
Although Rosenberg gives several descriptions of the emergence of 
modern Europe from the middle ages, he avoids going back further than 
approximately the fourteenth century. He describes governments as 
allowing increased economic autonomy, the bringing in of laws to help 
facilitate trade, and the involvement of government in health and 
education. He speaks of the rise of Europe from the middle ages where 
"Political and Economic leadership were one and the same"(lbid.pg.67). He 
speaks of the fall of feudalism and the rise of pluralism. But even though 
his analysis and historical perceptions seem sound, they could be given 
more credence if looked at in a broader historical context; in fact, my 
later discussion of the observations of Lynn White does this. First though, 
I believe we can elucidate some of Rosenberg's conclusions in the context 
of Joseph Needham's work. 
Needham's analyses of Chinese economic history provide a reference 
point against which Western progress can be viewed. In "The Grand 
Titration", Needham tries to discover why the West pulled ahead of China. 
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He asks, What was in Europe, but not in China, that could have caused this 
'split'? 
Prior to the time of economic divergence (about the fifteenth century, 
according to Needham), both regions could be termed feudalistic. Yet in 
China, power was held by a non-hereditary elite - the mandarinate - which 
was reselected every generation. This constituted a bureaucracy of 
individuals who had control - thus Needham's phrase "bureaucratic 
feudalism". 
It was the very nature of this structure that did not allow China to 
progress technologically; by implication, it was the lack of this structure 
that did allow the West to advance. 
Bureaucratic feudalism inhibited capital accumulation in any form 
among the people, because anything accumulated (in the industrial sense) 
would be passed down from generation to generation, thus creating the 
potential for wealthy individuals to gain power and thus usurp that of the 
mandarinate. 
This elite group of bureaucrats, chosen on the basis of their talents, 
reselected every generation, so noble in concept, was the main 
impediment to its society's advancement. It is ironic that in the West, 
where power often rested in the hands of those who lacked legitimacy, 
technological progress was free(er) to take place. 
Needham identifies further explanations for the West to have advanced 
relative to China. There was a distinctly noninterventionist attitude in 
China, which fostered an entirely different attitude towards science than 
that in the West. Nature was to be observed and studied, which is why 
Astrology and the study of tides and Navigation flourished. In the West 
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however, nature (and science) were to be dominated and put to use. By the 
fifteenth century the Chinese had developed the Natural Sciences to a far 
greater degree than in Europe; it took the Europeans to borrow this science 
and exploit it in the pursuit of wealth though. In the West, we have an 
interventionist attitude, "so natural to a people of shepherds and 
seafarers."(Joseph Needham, "The Grand Titration", London, 1969. pg. 211) 
Thus in fostering the study of nature, China succeeded in developing a 
formidable knowledge of Natural Science; yet in its bureaucratic 
feudalism it stifled the mercantile mentality, and thus the incentive to 
make use of its knowledge. As Needham suggests, it was precisely the 
development of a mercantile mentality which allowed the West to 
advance. 
Although Needham downplays the role of cultural-spiritual factors in 
the development of the West, he does cite one such element (or more 
precisely the lack of it) in explaining China's failure to keep up with the 
West. "Wealth as such was not valued. It had no spiritual power. It could 
give comfort but not wisdom, and in China affluence carried comparatively 
little prestige." (lbid.pg.202) 
So, by implication, there are three elements that the West had that 
China did not which allowed for Western growth: a type of feudalism 
which allowed for the development of capital accumulation and 
mercantilist ways; lack of barriers to the exploitation of scientific 
knowledge; and a societal value that wealth was good and to be strived 
for. 
Thus, in their attempts to understand Western advance, Needham and 
Rosenberg have two elements in common. First is that the European 
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feudalistic system allowed a "mercantilist mentality" to develop. Second 
is the coming together of science, technology, and economic growth. I will 
briefly describe Rosenberg's thoughts on both points, that they may be 
viewed in light of what Needham has said. 
Rosenberg stresses that Western European feudalism "contained the 
seeds of social arrangements suited to sustained economic growth" 
(Rosenberg, op.cit.,pg.60). In the West, the essential feature of feudalism 
was the "parallel structuring of military authority and land tenure" 
(lbid.,pg.61 ), where land was parcelled out to the Sovereign's military 
leaders, who in turn alloted their holdings to their underlings. The leaders' 
tenure of the land stayed in the family. This allowed for, over generations, 
the development of many "power centres", each with its priorities and 
aspirations. 
Like Capitalism, feudalism evidently belongs to the class of 
societies with plural hereditary power centres, and it is tempting to 
believe that capitalism first arose in such societies in 
Europe ... because hereditary property and a substantial measure of 
personal autonomy (albeit only in the top strata of society) were 
already established institutions. "(loc.cit.) 
Western European feudalism had in itself the makings of its own demise: 
it inevitably had to lead to change. Its pluralism provided opportunities 
for "experimenting with new modes of trade and warfare."(lbid.pg.67) In 
short it allowed for the beginnings of economic growth. Conversely, the 
bureaucratic feudalism of the East, while trying to maintain its power 
structure, created barriers to change, and in so doing sealed its fate. 
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It is clear from reading Rosenberg that science and invention do not in 
themselves account for Western advancement. China, and even Islam, were 
both ahead of the West in the Natural Sciences; yet neither China nor 
Islam experienced significant economic progress. Obviously science and 
invention in themselves do not fully explain growth. Indeed, as Rosenberg 
makes clear, in the first few hundred years of Western progress, science 
developed practically independently of industry (lbid.,pg.23). In fact, 
technology frequently originated with the artisans themselves. 
Yet, since the mid-1800's, the relationship between science, technology, 
and economic growth has been systematic, typified by and embodied in the 
industrial research laboratory. The boundary between pure science and 
industrial technology has become blurred, especially in such areas as 
chemistry and electricity. The base of scientific knowledge has expanded 
greatly, and the industrial laboratory has allowed markets, firms, and 
scientists to draw on this base and push out the bounds of progress. "It 
was not so much that the possibilities of artisan invention were 
exhausted as that the expansion of science had opened a new world of 
professional invention."(lbid.pg.29) As Needham points out, it was 
precisely this "world of professional invention" that China did not exploit, 
and thus a cause of its failure to match the progress of the West. 
As a note, it is interesting to point out that although Needham and 
Rosenberg have two common elements in their analyses of Western 
progress, their explanations have different elements as well. Needham 
points to how the West valued wealth, and thus cites it as a reason for 
Western advancement, whereas Rosenberg does not attach significance to 
it. This is because Needham approaches the problem completely 
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differently: he looks at what was apparent in the West, but not in China, 
that could account for the West's progress. This allows Needham to gain a 
different perspective than Rosenberg, and thus reach different 
conclusions. Further, Rosenberg chooses to look at Western growth but to 
avoid cultural explanations; Needham has no such reservations. Finally, 
Rosenberg is an Economist, whereas Needham is an Historian, and each 
approaches the question from a different point of reference; it is not 
surprising therefore that Rosenberg does not identify Needham's cultural 
explanations, and that Needham does not identify all of Rosenberg's 
institutional explanations. 
At this point, having identified the conclusions of Rosenberg and 
Needham, I believe we can gain insight to our fundamental question by 
going back even further in history. It is with this in mind that we can look 
at the work of Lynn White in order to understand what made the West 
different from the rest of the world. 
Of particular interest, White (in his essay "What Accelerated 
Technological Progress in the Middle Ages?") talks about the relative 
freedom with which technology flowed between Western Europe, the 
Orient, Africa, and so on. He shows that, as far back as Antiquity, 
technological innovation often ended up in geographically diverse areas. 
From this, he makes the interesting point that technological innovation 
must be seen not only as the skill to create new technologies, but also the 
ability to utilise imported techniques and to adapt and improve upon them. 
A reason to take this to heart is seen in modern Japan's ability to 
integrate and improve upon Western innovation and institutions. 
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I find it interesting that White disagrees with Rosenberg and Needham 
on when the West began pulling ahead. Rosenberg looks to the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries, Needham to the fourteenth, whereas White 
identifies innovations which showed the West's "distinct originality" 
(White, "What Accelerated Technological Progress in the Middle Ages?", 
New York, 1963.pg.277) as early as the sixth century. 
White points to the heavy plough, field rotation, the modern horse 
harness, and the introduction of the nailed horseshoe as being intrinsic to 
Northern Europe's agricultural preeminence of the time. 
He follows these innovations through their many consequences: 
increased food production, rises in population, increased sizes of 
agricultural villages, urbanisation, and the freeing up of labour to leave 
the farms for the cities. 
"More than any other single factor, this agricultural revolution of the 
early middle ages helps us to understand the shift of (the West's) focus 
from the Mediterranean to the Northern Plains."(lbid.pg.278) It becomes 
clearer later on as to not only why the shift took place, but also why this 
shift was important. 
White makes reference to developments in military invention in Western 
Europe between the eighth and tenth centuries. Military inventions which 
were either created in Western Europe, or just fully utilised there, had 
dramatic implications (including the development of the feudal system) 
(lac.cit). The stirrup, new types of armour, lances held at rest, to name a 
few, were used to their fullest in the West. "Thus having seized the 
leadership in agrarian methods in the sixth century, the medieval west did 
the same in military technology two hundred years later."(lbid.pg.279) 
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As final evidence of the West's dramatic movements forward, White 
examines the fact that, by the year 1000, the West had begun to utilise 
natural power in the forms of wind and water, as labour saving devices. 
This innovation spread throughout all of Europe and much of the East, and 
revolutionised industry over the next five hundred years. 
Given these three broad technological revolutions in Europe, 
(specifically Northern Europe), we find ourselves asking why it occurred 
where it did, rather than in either of its "sister cultures of Byzantium and 
Islam"?( I bid .pg .280) 
White provides several explanations. I believe they are not only 
compelling, but also serve as a foundation upon which Rosenberg's 
hypothesis can be built. White's explanations do not contradict 
Rosenberg's; they do however, go further to the 'root'. 
The source of Western progress has frequently been cited as its ability 
to adapt. Indeed, the barbarian invasions which occurred in the West 
between the third and the tenth centuries virtually ensured a flexible, 
fluid attitude in the West. Chaotic times forced a society to develop which 
was open to change- out of necessity; "(the West) was singularly open to 
change." (lbid.pg.282) 
Invasions forced the West to adapt, and to take on new responsibilities. 
Therefore it is no surprise that this should be a fundamental reason for 
the ensuing growth which occurred in the West. Growth is a form of 
change, and thus growth could not be expected to occur where change does 
not. 
But surely a society's ability to change and adapt must be accompanied 
with a motivation besides force, if it is to progress. Needham, as we saw, 
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acknowledged the West's ability to use and adapt science and technology 
to advance itself; the motivations for doing so however, are primarily a 
question of culture. 
There is a tendency with White to emphasise the religious motivation 
for the West exploiting its surroundings. He points to "the fundamental 
change in the attitude toward nature which occurred with the spread of 
the new religion."(White,op.cit. pg.282) Further, "the last traces of the old 
Greek mythological subservience to the cosmos were eliminated by the 
influence of Christianity."(Sambursky, "The Physical World of the Greeks", 
New York, 1956. pg.241) In other words, the spread of Christianity 
contradicted the view that nature contained a spirit and that somehow the 
Earth, wind, and trees were intrinsically spiritual entities. Christianity 
came along, and with it a "cult of saints" (White, op.cit. pg.283) which 
usurped the mystique of nature and asserted humanity's monopoly on 
spirituality, thereby leaving nature to be despoiled and plundered as the 
inanimate thing it was. "The cult of saints smashed Animism and 
provided ... the naturalistic ... view of the world which is essential to a 
highly developed technology. "(lac.cit.) 
The idea that the West's attitude toward nature changed and thus so did 
its economic growth pattern, is appealing. We can look at many societies 
who still (up until recently) worshipped nature. For instance, many of the 
North American Indians had such beliefs. And it is also a fact that their 
technology remained relatively unadvanced. 
However there is evidence that a change of attitudes toward nature was 
occurring in the West even before the spread of the new religion 
(White, "Medieval Religion and Technology", Berkeley, 1978. pg.251) 
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In fact, White acknowledges this: he points to the heavy plough, in the 
sixth century (loc.cit.), as being an agricultural innovation that totally 
reversed attitudes to the land; "formerly (man) had been part of nature, 
now he became an exploiter of nature"(lbid.,pg.251 ). 
The heavy plough, developed in Northern Europe, and specifically suited 
to the rich heavy soil of the region, not only may have been responsible for 
a change of attitudes, but also was the basis of the manorial system 
(where peasants pooled their resources [such as oxen] in order to increase 
efficiency [operate the heavy plough]). In relatively short order (the eighth 
century) the invention of the three field system dramatically increased 
the productivity of agricultural labour. These improvements brought 
improved prosperity and a decided agricultural advantage to the North. 
Both innovations were undoubtedly responsible in great part for the 
shift from the Mediterranean to the North as the centre of European 
civilisation; by implication they were sources of the West's advancement 
relative to the rest of the world (lbid.pg.17). 
White nevertheless points to more compelling evidence of the religious 
influence. It has become a fundamental element of Western Christianity 
that work is good- indeed (as St. Paul asserts) labour is a form of 
worshipping God. In its most extreme form, Puritanism looks to work as 
being the fundamental means of worship. What a stark contrast to the 
Greco-Roman view that labour was more of a sin than a virtue. It is 
conceivable that this 'work-ethic' has had a considerable influence on 
Western growth. 
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However two points have to be made here. First concerns the West's 
desire to embrace egalitarianism as it is propounded in Christianity. All 
"people" (people meaning men) were equal in God's eyes, and no one was 
lesser than anyone else. Therefore, to make someone do servile labour was 
unjust. Further, if it was possible to enable a human to be spared the 
wretchedness of mindless work, then it was to be encouraged. There is no 
contradiction; yes, labour was worship; however, labour which was severe 
and undignified was unworthy of one of God's children and therefore if you 
could find a machine to do it, all the better. 
Thus White sees much of the West's technological innovation as being 
the result of the religious desire towards labour-saving machinery. 
"Western labour-saving power technology is profoundly humane in intent, 
and is largely rooted in religious attitudes. "(White, "What Accelerated ... ?" 
op.cit. pg. 291) 
Second, Christianity is not the same everywhere, and in describing its 
effects on the West I am stressing Western (as opposed to Byzantine) 
Christianity. The two are fundamentally different. Eastern Christendom is 
more mystical, contemplative, and abstract than Western Christendom. It 
is primarily a question of theoria versus praxis . In the East, "activity 
was something to be transcended,"(lbid.pg.290) whereas in the West, it 
was a priority. "In this Western atmosphere, technology could 
thrive. "(lac.cit.) 
The West found it important to invent and innovate; but this was not the 
case in Byzantium or Islam (White,"Medieval Religion and ... "op.cit.pg.224), 
or, as Needham points out, in China. Christianity, as compared to Buddhism 
and the religions of the East, is decidedly pro-technology. Matter was 
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created to be used. "Technological aggression, rather than reverent 
coexistance, is now man's posture toward nature" (lbid.,pg.251 ). Just as 
God created the cosmos, so must man (created in his image) alter and 
create his surroundings."These are the characteristics of the Judeo-
Christian view of reality and of destiny. They are alien to all the other 
major religions except Islam" (lbid.pg.237). White further asserts that 
"engineering had become explicitly connected with the virtues; it was 
integral to the ethos of the West" (lbid.pg.261 ). And finally "this new 
religion was the essential novelty and stimulus to 
innovation ... "(Ibid.pg .253). 
There has been criticism of White's work. I mentioned that, although 
agree with many of his conclusions, I think he emphasises religious 
explanations at the expense of agricultural/geographical ones. Bertrand 
Gille, in particular, has two major concerns: "a)in the North there was 
good soil, good forests, permanent waterways.: thus inevitable was the 
watermill, the heavy plough, rotation of crops ... Had other conditions 
prevailed (elsewhere) there too without doubt would have been similar 
innovations and ... rapid development ... b) from around 1150, the population 
of Western Europe grew a lot, thus forcing agriculture to be transformed." 
(Gille, "Comment," Scientific Change, 1963.pg.312) 
E. Olszewski's following comment is food for thought: 
To put it in a few words, it was not the Christian 
saints who did away with the nymphs who had under their 
care the rivers and streams and made them free for the 
water-wheels, but just the contrary- it was the 
water-wheels that drove away the water nymphs 
and made place for the Christian saints.(Oszlewski, 
"Discussion," Scientific Change, 1963. pg.332) 
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I would like to make one further point. It is very intuitively appealing 
to attribute some of the West's progress to its religious background; 
indeed, from what we have considered so far, the religious influence has 
been very important. But it is also clear that Christianity alone did not 
cause economic growth. It allowed, however, many of the barriers to 
economic growth to evaporate. It allowed the West to exploit nature; it 
allowed people to pursue material objectives unabashedly. As Landes says 
in his explanation for Western progress, "rationality and change" (Landes, 
"The Unbound Prometheus," London, 1969.pg.546) were the necessary 
elements. The new religion allowed for both of these. 
I have given much time to White's work because I believe it contains 
many of the answers to our original question: Why the West? I believe 
Rosenberg's analysis to be accurate, but incomplete. I think Rosenberg was 
intent on avoiding cultural and religious explanations since they are often 
too difficult to analyse, and are subject to less academic acceptance; they 
are explanations lacking in legitimacy to some. But that is an opinion. 
What is clear however is that Rosenberg fails to get to the source of 
Western progress. White at least gives it a shot. Both of their 
perspectives are nonetheless highly useful. 
I have also cited some points posed by various individuals which call 
into question the findings of White; hopefully they have provided a bit of 
balance. 
Joseph Needham's work, although it focusses mainly on China rather than 
the West, is the kind of study which is most illuminating. By comparing 
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two very different cultures, Western and Chinese, he weighs their 
similarities and differences and thus tries to show why one progressed 
and one did not. Perhaps we should question those hypotheses, (such as 
those of Rosenberg and White), which do not spend enough time on 
comparative study in their efforts to explain Western growth. 
In trying to answer our main question, we initially indicated that we 
were looking for necessary elements, and that only when taken together 
could these elements be considered sufficient in explaining Western 
progress. I believe that the three main views discussed- Rosenberg, 
Needham, and White- are compatible. They are three entirely different 
perspectives, but they are not contradictory. Further, I believe that when 
they are viewed in concert, they provide an answer to Why the West? that 
is robust and comprehensive. To summarise: By the year 1000, three broad 
technological revolutions had occurred in the West involving agriculture, 
military equipment, and natural power, which coincided with a revolution 
of cultural attitudes regarding the exploitation of nature, the 
sanctification of labour, and the desire to increase individual wealth. This 
'attitudinal' revolution was encouraged by the fluidity of Western society 
resulting from the early Barbarian invasions, and more importantly by the 
spread of Western Christianity. Further, Western feudalism allowed the 
religious desire to exploit nature and create wealth to be fulfilled via 
capital accumulation, the development of institutions favourable to 
economic progress, and an autonomous economic sphere. As feudalism 
allowed for change, it fostered its own demise, thus giving way to a more 
pluralistic society. The ensuing evolution and freedom of economic 
institutions saw increasing diversity within these institutions, and 
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increased exploitation of science and knowledge for the purposes of 
attaining wealth: both of which fuelled innovation, which has since 
become one of the main elements of Western growth. 
All of the above were, I believe, vital components to the West's rise to 
wealth. Taken individually, each only tells part of the story. I hope I have 
provided an explanation of Western progress that is comprehensive, and 
successful in identifying the primary causes. 
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